EPA/WEF's claim that there have never been any
documented cases of harm from land application of sewage
sludge is being refuted by the growing list of victims
requesting assistance from the organizations, Help for Sewage
Victims and the National Sludge Alliance. They came to these
organizations for help because the local and state regulatory
agencies and EPA refused to address the adverse health
effects they or their animals were suffering from exposure to
the pollutants in contaminated sludge. According to Sanjour,
people who go to the EPA for help will not find them an ally.
He says:
These are people who start out with a strong faith in
their country and its institutions, who had always
thought of the EPA as the guys in white hats who put the
bad polluters in jail. "If there were anything wrong
with it," they say, "the government wouldn't let them do
it." To their surprise, these folks find that the EPA
officials, rather than being their allies, are at best
indifferent and often antagonistic. They find that the
EPA view them, and not the polluters, as the enemy.
(p. 20)
EPA has not only refused to address any adverse health
effects from the spreading of sewage sludge, but it has given
money to the WEF to debunk victims claims of harm from
exposure to the pollutants in the sludge! For the purpose of
debunking these, what they refer to as "horror stories", EPA
appointed John Walker and Bob Bastian to work with WEF. In
their debunking project, "REST OF THE STORY," Walker and
Bastian enlisted the help of the WEF by giving them an
initial $300 thousand dollar grant.
In EPA memos dated 10-17-1994, 12-29-1994, and 2-27-
1995, WEF's contribution was discussed and Walker and Bastian
suggested a potential Writer/Coordinator, Dave Trouba, WEF
could hire for the debunking effort. An additional $650,000
was given to the WEF one year later (WEB page, March 15,
1996). While the announcement did mention a number of
research projects for the newly created WEF Research
Foundation, according to a memo from John Walker, EPA Project
Officer, to Nancy Blatt and Tim Williams, Co-Project Leaders
with WEF, it was clear that the primary purpose of the grant
and the WEF Research Foundation was to debunk the sludge
"horror" stories of people, animals and the environment which
had been harmed by the use of sludge/biosolids.
The EPAïs initial documented list of horror stories in
the EPA memos for WEF to debunk included:
1) Merco/NYC biosolids expose--TV Nations production--
Law suit by TX Attorney General--Merco Lawsuit--
Claims
2) Linda Zander case--sick & dead cattle,
worker health--Farm Bureau and Dairy Today stories.
3) Miami-Dade County biosolids causing loss of papaya
trees on 100 acres of land--$7 million settlement in
lawsuits by Miami--Dade -covered by United Press.
4) Pending Prime Time TV story on Torres Martinez
(Thermal, Ca.)--corrupt contractor, biosolids
mountain, and composting.
5) Tree kill in Washington State with King Co METRO
biosolids on Weyerhauser land.
6) Miniature horse deaths in Oklahoma.
7) Bioaerosols--claim need for 2 to 5 mile barrier in
NYC.
8) Banker Liability concerns--recent article in Banker
magazine saying farmers do not use biosolids.
9) Pathogen regrowth during shipment--Merco.
10) Biosolids a cause of AIDS.
11) Biosolids used on ball fields causing Lou Gehrig's
Disease--what it took to debunk this claim.
12) Maryland turf grass grower crop loss due to
biosolids use--involved grower's use of a highway
roller on his fields.
13) Raleigh, NC--dead cattle from nitrate poisoning due
to forage with high nitrogen content. Forage
was not mixed with other low-nitrate fodder as
advised by the POTW.
14) BLM (Federal Bureau of Land Management) policy
opposing use of biosolids on Federal lands: equating
its use to hazardous waste dumping and landfilling
raising SUPERFUND liability concerns.
15) Citizens irate over purchase of farmland for
biosolids use--how land ought to be used is big
issue--private developer conflicts--NIMBY-
personality clashes--often does not involve health
concerns."
According to Walker's memo, the EPA was controlling the
campaign to debunk the negative publicity of adverse health
effects, environmental damages and public concerns from the
use of sludge as a fertilizer. Walker wrote, "the target
audience may be the municipalities, contractors, WEF
spokespersons and other wastewater professionals, and maybe
the general public depending on the case."
Walker's memorandum to Nancy Blatt and Tim Williams of
the WEF explained to them how the "horror stories" should be
addressed:
Some of the cases may be written up for more than one
audience, (i.e., differently for each different
audience)."..."Interestingly, many of us in the
regulatory and municipal arena do not have credibility
with local citizens. We need to get those that do
supplied with "The Rest of the story".
Walker continued:
If the cases were (1) Merco/NYC, (4) Prime Time Torres
Martinez, (9) Pathogen regrowth, and (15) Citizens irate
over purchase; then one audience would be the
municipality." He added further, "The write up would
tell municipalities what went wrong and what to do with
respect to control and management oversight to maximize
public acceptance and minimize negative publicity and
rejection of the recycling that is planned or underway."
Walker's further instructions to WEF's Nancy Blatt were:
If the cases were (2) Zander, (4) Miami-Dade, (5) Tree
Kill, (6) Miniature horses, (7) Bioaerosols, (10) AIDS,
(11) Lou Gehrig's Disease, (12) Turf grass loss, (13)
Dead cattle in NC; then the audience might be the
general public who various anti groups tell the
"horrors" of these cases and to which we would tell the
rest of the story.
According to Walker:
The audience might also be WEF biosolids spokespersons
and/or the wastewater professionals who would be working
with the general public to tell the authoritive truth.
Some of the cases may be written up for more than one
audience, (i.e., differently for each different
audience).
Time and space restrain us from writing in detail about
how EPA/WEF debunked each of the stories on the list. We
have selected excerpts from EPA/WEF Fact Sheets on Number 1,
Merco and Number 2, Zander to show how the debunking process
worked.
Number 1 on the list to debunk was the Merco/NYC
biosolids TV expose with EPA's Bob Bastian as the contact
person. The first WEF/EPA fact sheet focuses on Sierra
Blanca, Texas where national attention was drawn by TV
Nation's program which followed a Merco sludge train from New
York to Sierra Blanca. What worried WEF and EPA most about
the Sierra Blanca incident was the effect on the audience of
the appearance of EPA's own senior hazardous waste expert,
Hugh Kaufman, who said on the program:
What you have here is an illegal `haul and dump'
operation masquerading as an environmentally beneficial
project, and its only a masquerade---The fishes off New
York are being protected, the citizens and land of New
York are being protected, and the people of Texas are
being poisoned. Something is rotten in Texas. (Stauber,
John, & Rampton, Sheldon, (1995) Toxic Sludge Is Good
for You (p. 118)
An irate Merco sued Kaufman and TV Nation's producer,
Sony Entertainment Pictures, as well as Bill Addington, a
local merchant, accusing them of "defamatory and disparaging
statements....made with actual malice and reckless disregard
for truth" (Ibid, p. 118). Addington was dropped from the
suit at the last moment, mainly because he had nothing they
could take after his lumber yard was burnt. Addington's
activities in opposing the sludge dumping also cost him his
wife and adopted son because of their fear of harm.
Since June 1992, New York sludge has been transported by
rail to a 128,000 acre ranch in Sierra Blanca, Texas owned by
Merco Joint Venture. Approximately 80 tons a day of Class B
sludge is spread on the ranch to fertilizer the grass. Due to
local opposition and national attention, EPA and WEF had to
create a public relations fact sheet extolling the Merco
project as an example of a successful beneficial sludge use
project.
We have selected excerpts from a few of the WEF/EPA
major contentions and answered them with the rest of the
story which was not told in the fact sheets.
WEF/EPA Biosolids Fact Sheet 1
BIOSOLIDS RECYCLING IN WEST TEXAS
Statement:
Detractors have expressed concerns that the quality
of the biosolids may be poor or even hazardous.
Answer:
The fact is that New York City sludge is hazardous.
According to a New York City study (Wat. Sci. Tech.
(1987) Vol. 19, No. 9.p. 133, pretreatment by industry
would not help New York City control the toxic metals.
They say, "The 1970 to 1972 study of the sources of
these heavy metals in New York City waste-water
concluded that even with zero discharge by industry, 94
percent of the zinc, 91 percent of the copper, 84
percent of the cadmium and 80 percent of the chromium
being discharged would continue to be discharged by
sources virtually immune to treatment (Ref. 1)."
Furthermore, the study found p. 142), "For land
application, the Task 4 Report used NYDEC criteria
(Table 5). It concluded that because of
metals concentration, 94% of New York City Sludge is
presently unacceptable for land application. After
pretreatment, either through local limits or categorical
standards, 83% to 84% of New York City Sludges would
still be unacceptable for land application. The reason
for this is that non-domestic sources of pollutant
loading, not industrial sources, are primarily
responsible for interfering with this sludge use.
According to information furnished to the Texas
Department of Natural Resources in 1992, New York City
did have a major sludge problems: 1) 12 of 14 treatment
plants failed copper limits; 2) 1 plant failed the
cadmium limit; and 3) 3 of 14 plants failed arsenic
limits.
New York City had a much greater problem under the
proposed regulation with organics: 1) the sludge was so
contaminated that 11 of the 14 plants failed on PCBs
because they could not get a clean sample. The test
equipment detection levels were well above the proposed
regulated level in part 503; 2) the same was true for
Toxaphene at 4 of the 14 plants; 3) 1 plant failed on
Diemethyl Nitrosamine because of the detection level; 4)
9 of 14 plants failed on DDT/DDE/DDD levels because of
high equipment detection limits.
Yet, Texas still welcomed the sludge which was too
contaminated to be used as a fertilizer in New York
State. In fact, according to the fact sheet, by the
time the sludge got to Texas it was magically
transformed into Exceptional Quality (PC) Biosolids.
What actually happened was that EPA/WEF did a little
creative lying in the fact sheet.
Statement:
Biosolids are analyzed and tested routinely for
pollutants and disease causing organisms using Toxicity
Characteristic Leachate Procedure (TCLP) tests.
Answer:
The TCLP test method can only be used to detect a
few of the estimated 500,000 chemicals which can be
found in sludge. The TCLP test method can not be used
for detection of disease causing organisms in sludge.
The TCLP test simulates, in a laboratory, the potential
for a percentage (approx. 5%) of a hazardous substance
to leach out of a given sample under mismanaged landfill
conditions. There is no direct correlation between TCLP
test results and the Total Metals Test used for the Part
503 regulation. In fact, based on the problems New York
City had with the detection limits, there may be no
relationship between the Total Metals Test results and
the actual quantity of a pollutant in the sludge.
The Total Metals Test, which is normally used by
POTWs, is a cheap test. It supposedly measures the total
amount of metals in a given sample. As an example, in
column 1 of Table 1, in the fact sheet, the EQ or PC
federal limit for lead is 300 ppm which is derived from
the standard Total Metals Test methods.
The lead level of 193 ppm in column 2, for Merco,
according to the fact sheet, is derived from the TCLP
hazardous waste test method. The 193 ppm is only that
part of the lead which would leach out of the hazardous
waste under mismanaged landfill conditions at a rate of
1 part in 20.
This indicates that had the total metals test
method been used, the Part 503 EQ limits of 300 ppm
would have been exceeded by approximately 3,560 ppm.
This would also have exceeded the New York State ceiling
limit of 840 ppm for lead by approximately 3,020 ppm.
Actually the numbers indicate that New York City's
pretreatment program must have improved the quality of
the sludge at least by half since the Water Science
Technology study of 1987, which showed the average level
of lead in the NYC sludge was 6,400 ppm.
If this sludge was so clean, as the fact sheet
indicated, why wasn't it spread on farmland in New York
State? Why did New York City pay Merco $800 a ton to
take sludge out of State when the average instate cost
(according to a Pima Gro Systems letter to Imperial
County, dated May 17, 1996), for municipalities to
recycle sludge in a comparable State like California
ranges "from the high teens and low twenty dollar per
ton for biosolids?"
The disturbing fact is that this Class B sludge sent
to Texas may be the least hazardous portion (27%) of the
NYC sludge. The major portion (67%) is processed into
Class A sludge by the New York Organic Fertilizer
Company where there are no records or labels required to
leave a paper trial when the product leaves the plant.
The Biosolids Fact Sheet 1 noted that, "Merco handles
27% of New York City biosolids. About 67% goes to the
New York Organic Fertilizer Company, where they are
pelletized. Pelletized biosolids have been used on dry
wheat farms in Colorado, irrigated cotton and grain
farms in Arizona, and Citrus orchards in Florida. The
remaining six percent is landfilled." (p.5)
Statement:
After treatment in New York City, Merco voluntarily
tests the biosolids to further ensure compliance with
metal and pathogen requirements before they are loaded
into sealed containers for shipment to Texas. The City of
New York also conducts its own tests.
Answer:
In spite of all these tests, according to their own
Fact Sheet, In September 1993, a series of human errors
in New York City and in Texas led to the application of
nine rail containers of biosolids that had failed to
meet the detention requirement for PSRP (time for
pathogen reduction) . (p. 3)
Regardless of what the cause was, it was still put
on the land without meeting the Pathogen reduction
requirements in Part 503. The EPA/WEF fact sheet
claimed tests for pathogens done on the soil showed the
pathogen levels had dropped to acceptable levels. The
problem is that while there is a pathogen standard for
sludge there is no pathogen standard for soil.
According to their own fact sheet, pathogen
reduction has been a problem, especially pathogen
regrowth. The fact sheet says, "In Texas, the regular
testing for the presence of pathogen indicators has
occasionally revealed varying levels above the federal
and state regulatory limits, causing concern about
pathogen regrowth during transport." The excuse for
the regrowth, which the fact sheet claimed was verified
by an independent analysis by Alternative Resources,
Inc., of Stroudsberg, Pa., was "variations were most
likely caused by inconsistencies in the sampling and
analytical methods at the five separate labs conducting
the analysis. (p. 3)
We are supposed to believe that five separate
laboratories, who follow approved EPA procedures, can
not perform a simple fecal coliform test, which is done
routinely by municipal treatment plants. If these
inconsistences are occurring in five separate
laboratories how can we place any confidence in any of
the results of tests done to detect pathogens? Who are
Alternative Resources, Inc.? Is it a laboratory? Was
any pathogen test actually performed by Alternative
Resources for comparison, if not, why not?
Statement:
Several stricter-than-normal measures, either
imposed by Texas or volunteered by Merco were
implemented. These included: a biosolids application
rate at less than agronomic rate; an initial 2-year
delay before grazing cattle on biosolids-applied land.
Answer:
An agronomic rate as defined in the fact sheet is
"the rate of biosolids application that is designed to
provide the amount of nitrogen needed by a crop or
vegetation to attain a desired yield by minimizing the
amount of nitrogen that will pass below the root zone of
the crop or vegetation to the ground water."
If the agronomic rate is needed to provide the right
amount of nitrogen to the crop, why have they applied
the sludge at levels below the agronomic rates?
How will the sludge applications benefit the soil if
they fail to meet the nitrogen requirements?
For what reason have they chosen to apply at these
rates? Is it because they fear acute adverse health
effects or environmental damage at even agronomic rates?
If sludge is as safe as they claim and if the test
results show the sludge to be so `clean' as indicated in
the Table 3 on page 4 of the fact sheet, why are they
preventing cattle from grazing on the sludge site for 2-
years? EPA's Part 503.32(b)(5)(v) says, Animals shall
not be allowed to graze on the land for 30 days after
application of sewage sludge.
Statement:
Texas A & M research indicates that there is no
significant airborne movement of organic material from
the biosolids site (such as pathogens and/or plant
materials) and particulate matter (other organic matter
and inorganic matter, such as dust or metals).
Was it possible that the reason for the low application
rates were to prevent the pathogens from leaving the
site during the air sampling period?
No mention is made of organic chemicals in the
samples collected. Is that just an oversight or was it
possible they were not testing for the chemicals--
dioxins, Furans, PCBs which are detected at low levels.
Dioxins have been detected even in the parts per
quadrillion. Is it probable that no tests were conducted
on any organic chemicals because they are not regulated
in Part 503?
Number 2 on the list to debunk is Linda Zander. Linda,
a very caring and compassionate person, created a non-profit
organization called Help For Sewage Victims to offer any
victims of sewage sludge--advice, information, a data base,
and a sympathetic ear. Since its inception, Help for Sewage
Victims has been very effective in combating the spreading of
sewage sludge. Zander's story and stories of others harmed
by sewage sludge have been reported in over 30 mostly small
newspapers and 4 farming magazines since 1991 as well as in
John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton's book, TOXIC SLUDGE IS GOOD
FOR YOU! (1995)
Through Zander's efforts and those of other tireless
workers in grassroots movements across the United States, the
harmful effects of land application of sewage sludge, sewage
sludge composting and pelletizing are coming to light.
Seeking recompense for the harm done them, Linda and Ray and
their family filed suit against the sludge hauler, Western
Services Inc., the district of Birch Bay, the towns of
Lynden, Everson, Nooksack, and Sumas, Whatcom County, and Van
Dalen in 1991. When Linda went to the courts seeking justice
for the terrible wrongs that were done to her and her family,
she learned the painful truth that the justice system in the
United States can be subverted by legal and procedural
issues.
The suit against Whatcom County and the municipalities
were dismissed under the Public Duty Doctrine by summary
judgment. The Whatcom County Superior Court on October 8,
1993, held that the county had no duty to protect the
Zanders, only a duty to the general public and they were
individuals. The Zanders' claim against the various
municipalities was dismissed when their attorneys, Bricklin
and Collins, failed to comply with the municipal claims
statute 40 CFR Part 135 which states a 60 day notice has to
be given before a suit can be filed under the Clean Water
Act. When the Zanders appealed the decision to the
Washington Court of Appeals, the Court affirmed the trial
court decision on July 31, 1995. The Zanders' legal battle
was halted when the Washington Supreme Court refused to
review the decision.
When they brought a malpractice suit against Bricklin
and Collins, the Superior Court of the State of Washington
granted summary judgment of dismissal to the defendants,
Bricklin and Collins. Although the judge noted that the state
did have a responsibility to protect the individuals, the
cities involved had a duty to dispose of the sewage sludge--
and they were only doing their job. The Zanders' are
appealing the decision of summary judgment based on
malpractice which the judge concurred with, nuisance,
trespass, inverse condemnation and damage to property and
persons.
The Zanders' have never had their day in court
where they could address the sludge issues. Powerful
entities (Washington State Department of Ecology and King
County Department of Metropolitan Services, the EPA, AMSA and
WEF) have conspired to prevent this from ever happening.
According to documented evidence, on February 22, 1993, two
State Department of Ecology Representatives, Al Hanson, and
Kyle Dorsey, four King County Metro representatives, Mark
Lucas, Carol Ready, Steve Gilbert, Dan Sturgill and their
legal counsel, Salley Tenney, of the Metro Legal Services,
Mel Kemper of the City of Tacoma, Hal Thurston, an attorney
representing the cities that were involved in the Zanders'
lawsuits and four individuals also associated with the Zander
law suit, met in a closed meeting to discuss the Zander Case.
According to Keith A. Bode, as recorded in the Zander Action
Summary, the legal cost to stop her will exceed $500,000
dollars.
Bode warned those in attendance at the meeting that
Zander had to be stopped. He said that she had identified 18
medical experts (including physicians, immunologists,
toxicologists, and nutritionists), 9 veterinarians, 2
property valuation/devaluation experts, 3
soil/hydraulic/geologic experts and 1 testing lab who would
testify about the dangers of sewage sludge use to humans and
animals. Bode warned that there would be extra-regional
impact and "This action must not be settled". He reminded
those present:
The public persona of biosolids is precarious, at best,
and each member of WEF and AMSA can be assured that
Zander appears dedicated to capitalizing on every
available opportunity to publicize her scare story...and
remember, with respect to land application, the farming
community comprises less than 2% of the population, so
she need only reach a narrow population to cripple land
application. It is essential that her soapbox be removed
and her credibility challenged before our regional
problem has any more effect (than she has now)
nationally or internationally on land application of
biosolids.
Linda's active fight against the land application of
sewage sludge and sewage sludge sold as a fertilizer for
lawns and gardens made her a target of both the EPA and WEF.
She became number 2 on the EPA's hit list of sludge "horror
stories" which they paid the Water Environment Federation to
debunk. They had to coverup any damage to human health and
the environment. After all their propaganda said sludge was
perfectly safe and there had never been any documented cases
of any adverse health effects from land application of sewage
sludge.
Using a "blame the victim" strategy, the writer of the
EPA/WEF Biosolids Fact Sheet on Linda stated that "Poor
operating conditions, faulty equipment and corroded piping at
the Pangborn well may explain high levels of zinc and other
metals found in some samples of the well water." When Linda
read the EPA/WEF Fact Sheet, she was astounded at what links
they would go to challenge her credibility. Determined to
expose their deliberate lies and fabrications, she wrote a
detailed rebuttal refuting one by one all of their major
points which would have put the blame on her and her family,
the victims, rather than where it should have been put--on
the sludge that had caused them harm.
In answer to their assertion that corroded pipes, and
faulty equipment had caused the well contamination, she
wrote: "There were no corroded piping. New pipe had been in
place for a number of years. The equipment was not faulty.
Farmer's Equipment monitored and serviced it regularly. They
found it in good condition."
Other "blame the victim" statements made in the WEF/EPA
Fact Sheet, she refuted include the following:
Statement:
The Zanders' cattle clearly grazed around the well,
which suggests the cows left manure around the well.
Corn was grown with fertilizer in the field surrounding
the well, as close as 30 feet to the wellhead. The
Zanders applied dairy waste and manure to the field next
to and uphill from the well.
Answer:
In order to avoid any contamination of the well
from manure, we used a 100' setback to the concrete
enclosed well when annually applying cow manure. We have
applied cow manure for years with no contamination. The
well was contaminated with metals, cesium, radium, and
organic tin, which comes from hospital wastes, toilet
bowl cleaners, and not manure!
Statement:
Investigators for the Whatcom County Health
Department found the well in disrepair as early as 1990.
While sampling for contaminants, state hydrologist, Dave
Garland, observed that the wellhead and well-house were
unsanitary and unsecured. The 250-gallon, galvanized-
steel tank potentially could have leached zinc into
water drawn from the Zander taps.
Answer:
The Whatcom County Health Department came only once
when the well equipment was being repaired, at the time
the county was pushing chlorination on all the community
well associations. Washington State Department of
Ecology, Dave Garland, who is not a qualified
hydrologist, observed rain on the ceiling of the well
when it was opened for repair and stated "Rat feces,
that's what contaminated the water."
The well was not normal in July 1990 and August
1990. It was not potable then. Well samples were not
taken from the steel tank, but from the well as required
by the Federal law. Obviously the writer knows nothing
about well-sampling procedures.
Statement:
The members of the Pangborn Water Association
removed the Zander well from their system in April 1991,
claiming water from the well was corrosive and the well
was running dry.
Answer:
The Pangborn Water Association discontinued and
abandoned the well, after contamination and at the
advice of the State Department of Health.
Statement:
The Zander's lawsuit claimed that several of their
150 dairy cows were sick and experiencing abortions and
sluggish reproductive habits due to biosolids
applications. Washington State University veterinarians
concluded that the cattle received poor-quality feed and
that some cattle deaths were misreported by the Zanders.
Answer:
Contrary to what was written in the EPA/WEF Fact
Sheet, Washington State University veterinarians did not
conclude that poor quality feed and some cattle deaths
were misreported. Feed tests and forage and grain
rations were provided to the WSU vets. These rations
were balanced by Land O'Lakes Cenex nutritionist on a
regular basis. No report by WSU vet ever stated that
the cows reported dead were suspect; diagnoses for cause
of death were documented for most.
Statement:
WSU veterinarians blamed poor management of
Zanders' herd for excess deaths.
Answer:
No WSU veterinarian ever blamed poor management of
the Zander's herd for the excess deaths.
Statement:
The veterinarians reviewed that data and examined
the herd, determining that low production rates and
diarrhea were associated with poor quality grass silage.
Grass silage was fed as the cows' only forage for at
least four weeks in 1990, and problems with the herd
stopped when silage rations were discontinued. Some
cattle illness and deaths also may have been the result
of noncompliance with vaccination strategies, food rot,
poor bedding of cows and milking hygiene, or force in
assisted calvings.
Answer:
At no time that I can remember [in 26 years] was
only silage fed to our cows. Our rations always included
alfalfa hay, and grain which was balanced by a
nutritionist. Our herd problems stopped the day the cows
were shipped out. Forty cows were sent to slaughter. As
to vaccinations and milking hygiene, herd health
(including vaccinations) and udder health records were
kept. Mastitis tests were done monthly. Bedding was
changed regularly.
In the same EPA/WEF Fact Sheet, the "blame the victim"
strategy was again used to explain the cause of deaths and
diseases of the dairy cows of another dairy farmer on the
other side of the country, Robert Ruane, of Rutland, Vermont.
According to the Fact Sheet, "Ruane possessed few herd
records, silage quality was poor, the recommended feeding
program was largely ignored, and feeding practice did not
meet National Research Council recommendations for lactating
dairy animals, the Vermont Department of Agriculture found."
(p. 8)
When we asked Bob Ruane to comment on the statements
made about him in the EPA/WEF Fact Sheet on the Zanders',
where he was accused of causing the death and disease of his
own cattle because he didn't follow the recommended feeding
program for lactating cows, and the silage he fed was of poor
quality, he was astounded. He didn't know he was written up
in a Fact Sheet.
As to the charge in the Fact Sheet that he was not
following the recommended feeding program for lactating dairy
cattle, he said he fed his cows a mixed ration of silage and
grains three times a day--at 4:00 in the morning, at 8:30 in
the morning and again at 4:30 in the afternoon. He said the
misunderstanding might have arisen when he told the State
agent what he fed the cattle at each feeding instead of the
total amount fed each day. As to the quality of the silage,
it is no doubt that it was of poor quality since it was grown
on the sludge-amended ground. It wasn't until he started
feeding silage from unsludged fields that his cattle
improved. Until his herd's health was damaged, he was
unaware that the silage was not only of poor quality, but
that it contained toxic elements that caused death and
disease in his herd.
It is obvious that the writer of the EPA/WEF report was
not raised on a farm or he wouldn't have made such asinine,
and ridiculous statements. I was reared on a farm in the
midwest where we raised beef cattle and swine as well as
grains. My dad came from a long line of farmers. Manure was
used as a fertilizer on crops including home gardens with no
adverse health effects ever. Of course then the manure was
"exceptional quality". Cattle were not ingesting crops grown
on sludge-amended soil with its organic chemicals and heavy
metals which could taint the manure. The Zanders, nor any
farmers, would ever be so stupid as to put manure where it
could contaminate the water that not only the animals drink,
but they also drink. Farmers are not the ignorant hayseeds
and country bumpkins EPA/WEF made them out to be. They are
intelligent people who practice good agricultural procedures.
If your livelihood depends on the health of your animals, you
will not compromise their health by feeding them poor quality
food and not complying with all requirements such as
vaccinations. A sick herd doesn't earn any money. Even
before computers, farmers kept detailed and well documented
records on their livestock and other farming operations.
Farmers are also subject to IRS audits where they have to
produce records.
If the writer had ever seen a calf or pig or other
animal born, he would have known that only on rare occasions
(breach birth) do you ever have to assist in its birth. It
doesn't take a rocket scientist to make a connection between
the land application of sludge and illness on these dairy
farms where there were never any problems until they were
exposed to the pollutants contaminating the sludge. It is
sludge not poor farming practices that are too blame for
these farmers woes.
Incidence Response Team
To placate the public, EPA has created an Incidence
Response Team to investigate public concerns associated with
the use of sludge under the leadership of Bob Brobst, who
is/was the sludge coordinator for Region Eight. According to
Perciasepe, Brobst "will be asked to update his protocol on
when and how the Incidence Response Team will work." Why
does EPA need an Incidence Response Team, if the statement
made by Alan Rubin, Ph.D. on November 2, 1995 is factual?
Rubin said, "Biosolids that have been land applied under
state and Federal requirements have never been documented to
cause any negative human health or ecological impact."
The first effort of the Team, according to Perciasepe,
"involves the Denver Metro site where {radioactive hazardous
waste} effluent from a Superfund site {Lowery landfill} is
scheduled to go into Denver Metro POTW and biosolids would go
onto their municipal owned {50,000 acre} ranch where wheat is
grown."
Joel Bleifuss, in his article, "The First Stone,
Radioactive Sludge", which was published April 28, 1997 in IN
THESE TIMES, reported EPA's plan to pipe the radioactive
waste from the Denver owned Lowery Landfill Superfund site
into Denver's treatment plant. Since the Lowery Landfill had
been declared a Superfund site in 1986, EPA and the City of
Denver had the responsibility to clean up the site. Denver,
who owned the landfill in which it dumped its own garbage,
and the Atomic Energy Commission contractors (Coors and
Rockwell International) who had placed radioactive waste in
the landfill, would normally share the major cost for the
clean up. Bleifuss says that he was tipped off to the story
by EPA's Hugh Kaufman who said "Follow the money...If you run
it through the city's waste-water treatment plant, then the
financial liability transfers from the parties responsible
for putting waste in the landfill to Metro--which means to
the taxpayers of Denver and suburbs--Coors and others are off
the liability hook." (p.12)
According to the article, Adrienne Anderson, who
teaches environmental ethics at the University of Colorado at
Boulder, who had been appointed to the Metro board to serve
as an advocate for the sewer district workers, discovered EPA
had secretly approved the plan without going through the
public hearing process as required by federal law. After
going public with her claim of plutonium contamination at
Lowery landfill, she was hassled by her fellow board members.
She has been called a troublemaker by fellow board members
and threatened with censure if she doesn't precede all her
public comments with the disclaimer that she is speaking
only for herself.
Anderson drew the anger of the board when she notified
members of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Local, who
worked at the Metro treatment plant, as well as leaders of
anti-sludge farming groups such as Family Farmers for
Environmentally Safe Use of Property (FES UP). When Anderson
complained to the U.S. Department of Labor and invoked the
federal laws protecting whistleblowers, it ruled in her favor
and ordered the board to rescind two letters containing the
threat of censure.
According to Bleifuss, Denver sells its sludge as a
fertilizer to the public under the brand name MetroGro at $2
per 20-pound bag or $20 a ton. He reports that sludge not
sold to the public as a fertilizer, will be applied to
Denver's 41,000 acre wheat farm near Deer Trail, Colorado.
According to neighbors of this site, Lylamae and Richard
Price, the pollutant contaminated runoff from the sludge site
"runs straight into the reservoir from which the Price's
cattle drink."
Bleifuss warns, "If the EPA's precedent-setting disposal
plan in Denver is allowed to stand, an already intolerable
situation will get worse. We can expect to see the industrial
poisons from the nations 1,255 other Superfund sites piped
into local sewers systems, turned into fertilizer, and
introduced into the food chain." (p.13)
According to CNN's June 1997 expose "Hazardous Harvest"
this is already happening--Superfund sites are already being
cleaned up by turning the hazardous waste into fertilizer.
According to the EPA's Regional Administrator, Marc Herman,
who manages the superfund sites clean up, this was "--not
precedent-setting -- it is being done at Superfund sites
across the country."
So now a new ingredient--radioactive waste--has been
added to the toxic soup of sewage sludge, along with disease
causing organisms (e.g., bacteria, viruses, and parasites),
dangerous heavy metals (e.g., cadmium, lead, mercury), and
deadly organic chemicals (e.g., dioxins, furans, PCBs, etc.).
The only other incidence mentioned in Perciasepe's
statement involved dead cows. He wrote, "His study [Brobst)
also is involving public acceptance and dead cows at another
site alleged to be associated with biosolids use, but is
not."
It is obvious from Perciasepe's statement that the
purpose of the Incidence Response Team is not to impartially
investigate any claims of adverse health effects and/or
financial damage to victims or damage to the environment from
the use of sewage sludge. If the Team hasn't conducted the
investigation yet, how could Perciasepe state, the dead cows
were not associated with the use of sewage sludge. We have
documentation of deaths of cows from exposure to pollutants
in sludge from Vermont to North Carolina, to Missouri, to
California and to Washington.
After what has been revealed in Perciasepe's statement,
where he requested more staff support for assistance because
of "emerging issues of concern associated with pathogens,
vectors, metals, toxic organic, odors, bioaerosols, and the
development of improved methodologies for monitoring the
levels of pathogens and pollutants in biosolids," it is
obvious this Team will be very busy. Since sludge has/is
being spread on farmland and sold as fertilizer to be spread
on lawns and gardens mostly unregulated and unmonitored there
will be many, many more victims and more "horror stories" for
the Team to debunk. Yours could be one of them .
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